The New Year Device Inventory Is a List You Can Wipe
Counting laptops is not control. Control is being able to point at one row on the sheet and reach that machine tomorrow.
January inventories fail in a predictable way. Finance has a purchase list. IT has an agent console. Neither matches the laptops people actually use, and neither can answer "wipe this one" for the rows that matter.
Four columns, then stop
- Serial and model.
- Person accountable, not "shared."
- Encrypted or not.
- Enrolled for remote wipe, with the date it last checked in.
Anything that cannot fill the fourth column is a project, not an asset you should describe as protected. That includes the executive assistant's personal phone with work mail, and the lab laptop that "does not like agents." Verizon's 2025 DBIR already showed where unmanaged machines with corporate logins end up. Revisit those figures if the exception list is getting comfortable.
DriveStrike is one way to fill the fourth column: enroll the device, then wipe, lock, or locate it from the console. Spearstone's older policy note, MDM policy examples, is the language. This inventory is the proof the language is true.
Run the sheet this month. Then trial DriveStrike on the rows that failed, or ask Spearstone to look at the gap with you.
Keep reading
- Holiday Travel Is When Company Data Rides in a Backpack
- When the Employee Leaves and the Laptop Does Not Come Back
Questions worth answering directly
What makes a device inventory useful in an incident?
You can identify the exact device, name a person, know if the disk is encrypted, and trigger lock or wipe. A purchase record alone cannot do the last step.
Should shared laptops be on the list?
Yes, with a named owner. Shared with no owner is how a missing device sits unreported.